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B . Douglas Bernheim and John B. Shoven 
According to official government figures, rates of saving in the United States 
declined precipitously during the 1980s and are currently much lower than in 
any other comparable period of our history. During the second half of the last 
decade, net national savings amounted to a paltry 2.7 percent of net national 
product, compared with 7.9 percent for the  1970s and 8.6 percent for the 
1960s. The United States saved a much smaller fraction of its national income 
than other industrialized countries throughout the postwar period. While the 
last decade witnessed a decline in saving throughout the developed world, the 
United States had the dubious distinction of leading the way. 
There is widespread agreement among economists that the consequences of 
low  saving are severe. When an individual fails to save, he jeopardizes his 
own economic security. Following retirement, serious illness, or involuntary 
job loss, he may well find that his resources are insufficient to maintain his 
accustomed standard of  living,  and at times he may experience significant 
hardship. Even if his luck holds out during his own lifetime, he will contribute 
little to the enrichment of his family line. 
Inadequate rates of saving have also been blamed for a variety of chronic 
macroeconomic problems. When a society fails to save, each and every indi- 
vidual  may ultimately pay the price for collective profligacy. Traditionally, 
many economists have been concerned about the link between saving and cap- 
ital accumulation.  If  chronically inadequate rates of  saving depress invest- 
ment, then the economy must follow a growth path on which output, income, 
productivity, and wages are all lower than they would be  in  a more frugal 
society. Relatively recent developments have also stimulated interest in the 
relationships between saving and international economic transactions. Some 
have argued that low rates of saving have compelled the United States to sell 
large chunks of  its capital  stock to  foreign investors at  “fire sale” prices. 
Others  insist  that  excessive  consumption is  primarily  responsible  for  the 
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staggering U.S.  trade  deficits of  recent  years  and  has  indirectly  brought 
about the deteriorating competitiveness of American industry. In short, it can 
be argued that inadequate saving threatens the foundations of economic pros- 
perity. 
The task of restoring acceptable rates of saving in the United States poses a 
major challenge to those who formulate national economic policy. During the 
1980s, widespread concern over various economic woes spawned a series of 
sporadic attempts to  stimulate saving and investment through policies that 
were designed to make these activities more rewarding. These policies in- 
cluded liberalized individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and Keogh Plans, the 
special treatment of  some reinvested dividends, reductions in capital gains 
taxes, and increased investment incentives at the corporate level. The results 
were, to say the least, disappointing. Despite the existence of ample economic 
incentives, rates of saving continued to decline steadily. 
Disillusioned with this approach, Congress eliminated many of  these spe- 
cial incentives in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Unfortunately, rates of saving 
failed to rebound significantly in the second half of the 1980s. This has gen- 
erated considerable support for the reinstatement of  several special provi- 
sions, such as the favorable treatment of capital gains, that were dropped only 
a few years ago. The Bush administration has even proposed the creation of 
“family savings accounts,” which  would  considerably broaden  the current 
scope of IRA-like investments. 
The 1980s provided a humbling experience for economists and policymak- 
ers alike. Certainly, we learned many lessons about the economy, but foremost 
among them was the realization that we still understand very little about the 
factors that motivate people to save. There are few areas within the field of 
economics where the need for continuing research is quite so urgent. 
This volume contains papers presented at an NBER conference on saving, 
held in Wailea, Hawaii, on January 6 and 7, 1989. The conference was part of 
the NBER’s Project on Saving and Investment. The goal of  the conference 
was to further our understanding of the determinants of saving, as well as the 
relationships between saving and various macroeconomic aggregates. The pa- 
pers in this volume may be grouped into five areas: (1) the measurement of 
saving, (2)  the effects of corporate saving, (3) the impact of taxation on sav- 
ing, (4) the relationship between saving and international capital flows, and 
(5) the relationship between saving and growth. The remainder of this intro- 
ductory section contains a brief summary of each paper. 
The Measurement of Saving 
A number of economists are skeptical about the validity of the official data 
on saving. Some contend that international comparability is a severe problem, 
despite efforts by  the OECD and other organizations to standardize national 
accounts. Others argue that arbitrary accounting conventions result in the ex- 3  Introduction 
clusion or mismeasurement of certain forms of saving. Some revisionists have 
even gone so far as to suggest that, once one adjusts the official figures appro- 
priately, saving rates during the 1980s were not significantly below historical 
averages. 
In “Market Value versus Financial Accounting Measures of National Sav- 
ing,” David F.  Bradford argues that notions of  saving based on the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) are seriously defective. These measures 
are similar in spirit to the financial accounting concepts that are used to derive 
the “net worth” of business enterprises. It is well known that accounting con- 
cepts provide imperfect measures of  economically meaningful variables. In 
particular, investment (and therefore saving) in NIPA is limited to acquisitions 
of tangible property, and depreciation is calculated mechanically as a function 
of historical cost. 
Bradford argues that it is more appropriate to measure saving as the change 
in the market value of net wealth. Certainly, expenditures on intangible assets 
such as advertising and R&D constitute investment, since they  enhance a 
firm’s command over future economic resources. Likewise, since individuals 
regard capital gains on existing assets as current income, unrealized or rein- 
vested gains should be thought of as saving. Changes in the market valuation 
of  an enterprise reflect both the value of  intangible investments and capital 
revaluations. Bradford therefore concludes that, if one is interested in explain- 
ing  saving behavior through conventional microeconomic theories,  then  a 
market-value notion of saving rather than the NIPA  accounting measure, is 
appropriate. 
Bradford considers several potential objections to the use of  market-value 
accounting. Chief among them is the claim that no reliable market-value data 
exists. In response, he points out that the National Balance Sheets, compiled 
under the auspices of the Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve, are a 
largely underexploited resource. In particular, the National Balance Sheets 
carry land and corporate assets at market value and, in addition, contain infor- 
mation about the stock of consumer durable goods. 
Measures of saving based on market-value accounting prove to be much 
more  volatile  than  conventional accounting measures.  Indeed,  Bradford’s 
time series for household and aggregate saving bear very little resemblance to 
the official numbers. He does find evidence of a long-term declining trend in 
the growth rate of real wealth per capita. However, his calculations also sug- 
gest that recent performance has been less disappointing than NIPA  figures 
would lead one to believe. Indeed, the current level of  wealth per capita is 
slightly above its long-term trend. 
Bradford acknowledges that there are a variety of  problems with the Na- 
tional Balance Sheets data and that his calculations provide imperfect mea- 
sures of market-value concepts. However, he argues that these calculations 
represent a distinct improvement over NIPA data and an important step toward 
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The Effects of Corporate Saving 
Two papers in this volume examine the question of whether the decision by 
corporations to retain or distribute earnings affects household-level consump- 
tion and saving. Do investors pierce the corporate veil and treat retained earn- 
ings as if  they were their own income? Understanding this issue would cer- 
tainly  be  important  if  one  wanted  to  design  policies to  increase national 
saving. If  the corporate veil is completely pierced, then any engineered in- 
crease in corporate saving would be completely offset at the household level. 
On the other hand, if  it is not, aggregate saving would presumably be posi- 
tively related to increases in its individual components. 
In “Dividends, Capital Gains, and the Corporate Veil: Evidence from Brit- 
ain, Canada, and the United States,” James M. Poterba addresses the question 
of the corporate veil by estimating aggregate consumption functions for three 
countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. If  there were 
no corporate veil, household consumption should be invariant to firms’ poli- 
cies regarding the distribution of earnings (holding the earnings themselves 
fixed). Instead of  using changes in dividend payments (which might signal 
improved prospects for the future and not simply a new payout policy) in his 
consumption regressions,  Poterba uses a variable constructed to reflect the 
relative tax  burden  faced by  dividends and capital gains brought about by 
retentions. He also examines whether involuntary capital gains resulting from 
corporate restructurings affect aggregate consumption and saving. 
Poterba’s results provide some evidence against the no-corporate-veil hy- 
pothesis. Under that hypothesis, one expects that increased dividends (hold- 
ing all else equal) or increased cash received from involuntary capital gains 
realizations would simply be offset by  the additional acquisition of  financial 
assets by  the recipients. The new payout behavior would leave consumption 
unchanged and would not change the composition of the assets of households. 
Poterba’s econometric regressions suggest that increases in dividend payouts 
increase consumption, particularly when that variable includes the expendi- 
tures on household durables. For the United States and the United Kingdom 
the coefficient reflecting the impact on consumption of reducing the relative 
tax penalty on dividend payments is consistently positive over a fairly large 
number of specifications, although only occasionally statistically significantly 
different from zero. The point estimates are about twice as large when con- 
sumption includes the purchase of durables as they are when only nondurables 
and services are used as the dependent variable. This suggests that much of 
the additional cash received by  the investors is used to purchase household 
durables, which contradicts the predictions of the pure life-cycle model. The 
point  estimates indicate that  nondurable consumption also increases when 
dividends are raised. The results for Canada show less of  an impact of cash 
receipt on consumer behavior (in fact, the point estimate of the relative divi- 5  Introduction 
dend tax variable is negative for some specifications), so in the Canadian case 
the analysis is more consistent with the no-veil hypothesis. 
Poterba’s analysis of the effects of the involuntary capital gains realizations 
due to mergers and acquisitions in the United States suggests that consumer 
spending increases due to these payments, although once again at least half of 
the increase in spending takes the form of the purchase of consumer durables. 
For both the United States and the United Kingdom, Poterba finds that be- 
tween 50 and 60 percent of the proceeds of these cash mergers are spent and 
not  reinvested in financial markets. The implication is that there is a fairly 
strong “mailbox effect.” That is, checks in  the mailbox affect spending far 
more than gains that simply show up on the stock listings in the newspaper. 
Poterba’s results are admittedly only suggestive. However, what they sug- 
gest is that corporate financial policies may have important implications for 
the aggregate saving rate in the economy. More research on this topic would 
seem desirable, particularly a more microeconomic evaluation of investor re- 
sponse to cash receipts. In the meantime, policymakers should be aware that 
the corporate veil may not be completely transparent. 
In  “Corporate Savings and Shareholder Consumption,” Alan J. Auerbach 
and Kevin Hassett also test for the presence of a corporate veil, again using 
aggregate macro time-series information. The authors argue that previous pa- 
pers claiming to have found evidence of a corporate veil have not completely 
neutralized the analysis from the informational content that may be conveyed 
by dividend increases. The life-cycle theory does not imply that consumption 
should not respond to changes in dividends, but only that consumption should 
be unaffected by wealth-neutral changes in payout policy.  They are skeptical 
as to whether previous investigators have appreciated this distinction and state 
that Poterba’s results in this volume are difficult to interpret because they are 
unsure whether the switch to a dividend tax preference variable (rather than 
dividends themselves) solves the problem. Poterba offers no evidence that 
changes in dividend taxes are independent of wealth changes. 
Auerbach and Hassett derive their econometric specification from a repre- 
sentative agent intertemporal utility optimization model. Unlike Poterba, they 
only examine consumption exclusive of  the acquisition of durables. Using 
quarterly and annual aggregate data from 1947 to 1986, the authors estimate 
that expected changes in dividends, holding wealth constant, do not cause a 
statistically significant change in consumption in their Euler equation frame- 
work. This is taken as evidence against the presence of a corporate veil and 
implies that wealth-neutral changes in  dividend payout behavior would not 
affect aggregate national saving. The authors are quick to point out, however, 
that their tests are not powerful enough to dispose entirely of  the possible 
existence of a corporate veil. 
Auerbach and Hassett proceed to investigate  the observed excess sensitivity 
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They find that their evidence is consistent with a considerable fraction of the 
population being subject to liquidity constraints. However, they doubt that the 
liquidity-constrained consumption case applies to the distribution of corporate 
earnings because equity ownership is so concentrated among the highest in- 
come households in the country. 
Finally, Auerbach and Hassett test whether the marginal propensity to con- 
sume out of corporate equity wealth is as high as the marginal propensity to 
consume out of other forms of wealth. If the marginal propensities are differ- 
ent, then a new form of corporate veil is introduced, because a shift in wealth 
from corporate equity to other forms will change aggregate consumption and 
saving. In this part of their paper, Auerbach and Hassett come up with a star- 
tling result. They find that there is no apparent effect of corporate wealth on 
consumption. The marginal propensity to consume out of such wealth is not 
significantly different from zero. This implies that transferring wealth out of 
corporate equities might indeed increase consumption and decrease saving. 
The authors concern themselves with the distribution of the holders of equities 
in trying to explain this result, but it clearly deserves more research and may 
mean that  the corporate veil does exist in  a somewhat different form and 
should be a consideration in the design of prosaving policies. 
Taxation and Saving 
The next group of  papers looks at the effect of  taxation on saving. Tax 
policy is one of the governmental instruments that is most often considered to 
alter saving behavior. A long literature exists arguing that an income tax dis- 
courages saving by taxing it twice: first, earnings that are saved are subject to 
tax, and second, the return on the savings is also taxed. The elimination of 
this double taxation is one of the appeals of  saving via pension vehicles and 
individual retirement accounts.  If  the  country  adopted a  consumption tax 
rather than an income tax, the double tax would be eliminated. 
In “The Saving Effect of Tax-deferred Retirement Accounts: Evidence from 
SIPP,” Steven F. Venti and David A. Wise examine a new source of  data re- 
garding households’ responsiveness to the availability of  tax preferred indi- 
vidual retirement accounts (IRAs). Using the Survey of  Income and Program 
Participants (SIPP) panel  data set, the authors document the low levels of 
financial assets held by most households at all ages and levels of income. The 
overall  median  level  of  household  financial assets  (including  saving  and 
checking accounts,  stocks, bonds,  etc.) was $1,600 in  1985. They further 
show that most IRA accounts are held by households with incomes less than 
$50,000 and with  only modest amounts of  financial assets. They find that 
families who contributed to IRAs after they became available in 1982 had not, 
prior to that time, accumulated financial assets at a rate even close to the IRA 
contribution ceiling. They also find no evidence that IRA contributions have 
been funded by borrowing. The overall conclusion from a descriptive look at 7  Introduction 
the SIPP data is that most IRA saving represented new saving and not a re- 
shuffling of existing accounts. 
Venti and Wise propose that IRA saving and other forms of saving are not 
perfect substitutes, largely because of the liquidity restrictions placed on IRA 
accounts. They present a model that permits these two forms of saving to be 
treated as separate goods. The model is estimated with the SIPP data and the 
perfect-substitutes  hypothesis  is  rejected.  They  simulate the  impact  of  a 
$1,000 increase in the IRA contribution ceiling. This affects only those who 
are  already  contributing  at the  maximum  level.  For those  households,  the 
model of Venti and Wise predicts that the $1,000 increase in the limit would 
result  in  an average  increase  in IRA contributions  of  $856 and an average 
decrease in other saving of only $22. Immediate tax proceeds would fall by 
$269, but the total effect of the increase in the ceiling would be an increase in 
the national saving rate. 
In “Consumption Taxation in a General Equilibrium Model: How Reliable 
Are Simulation Results?’  B. Douglas Bernheim, John Karl Scholz, and John 
B. Shoven seek to determine the confidence one can have in the point estimate 
results of computational general equilibrium models used to evaluate the im- 
pact of the U.S. switching from a personal income tax to a consumption or 
expenditure tax. Most general equilibrium evaluations of this issue have come 
to the conclusion that such a switch would increase saving and the long-run 
capital-labor  ratio and  substantially  enhance economic  welfare.  However, 
these general equilibrium models require a large number of parameter valua- 
tions  (particularly  behavioral  elasticities) that are not known with certainty. 
The research question that the authors address is how the uncertainty regard- 
ing input parameters translates to uncertainty about the model’s predictions. 
Bernheim, Scholz, and Shoven use the Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley model to 
examine this question. They present a technique of linearizing the model to 
get  an approximation  of the variances in the model’s predictions  given  the 
variance-covariance matrix  associated  with  the  underlying  parameters.  The 
consumption tax is modeled as an income tax with complete deductibility of 
saving (similar to unlimited IRA accounts with no withdrawal penalty).  The 
United States currently does not have a pure income tax, but rather a hybrid 
tax somewhere between an income tax and a consumption tax. This is due to 
the fact that at least half of saving is sheltered from taxation either through 
such vehicles as pension accumulations or through saving that takes the form 
of investment in owner-occupied housing. 
The results of Bernheim, Scholz, and Shoven are mixed. It does appear that 
the short- and medium-run results regarding the effects of the adoption of a 
complete consumption tax on saving are tied down fairly precisely. One can 
at least rule out the possibility that the effect is zero or of the opposite sign 
with a reasonable degree of certainty. The predicted impact of the tax policy 
change on the present value of utility or economic welfare is positive, but the 
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for this variable. The authors conclude that the results lend some support to 
the case for a consumption tax, but that they also emphasize the need for more 
precise econometric estimates of the various key elasticities in the economy 
(such as the saving and labor-supply elasticities) that are inputs to the general 
equilibrium models. 
In  “Taxes  and  Capital  Formation: How  Important  Is  Human  Capital?’ 
James Davies and John Whalley study the dynamic effects of taxes on saving 
and investment. Their analysis departs from most of the preceding literature 
on this subject by considering both human and nonhuman capital formation. 
The accumulation of human capital is of enormous quantitative importance 
in the U.S. economy. Moreover, human and nonhuman capital may function 
as substitutes, at least to some extent. For example, when the returns to phys- 
ical capital are taxed at higher rates, it is conceivable that individuals simply 
shift their resources toward education and training without actually lowering 
their overall levels of  saving. Thus, the omission of  human capital seriously 
limits the usefulness of  many previous models that have been used to study 
the welfare effects of capital income taxation. 
Davies and Whalley simulate the effects of  various tax policies, using  a 
fully dynamic,  overlapping generations model  of  the  U.S. economy. The 
structure of the model is conventional, except that the authors have incorpo- 
rated a process governing the accumulation of  human capital. The model is 
calibrated to a stylized data set that is intended to represent the position of the 
U.S. economy in the mid-1970s. 
For their dynamic general equilibrium model, Davies and Whalley find that 
the inclusion of human capital increases the short-run impact of taxes on sav- 
ing. However, they also show that the transition to a steady state is much more 
rapid than in the absence of human capital, and that there is very little distor- 
tion of human capital investment in the steady state. Consequently, they con- 
clude that the incorporation of  human capital does not significantly alter the 
full dynamic welfare effects of  most tax reforms. This conclusion stands in 
sharp contrast to  previous partial equilibrium results, which have suggested 
that the endogenization of  human capital substantially increases the welfare 
effects of various tax policies. 
National Saving and International Capital Flows 
In  a well-known study published in  1980, Martin Feldstein and Charles 
Horioka documented extremely high  correlations between domestic saving 
rates and domestic investment for industrialized OECD countries. This find- 
ing was widely interpreted as evidence of international capital market imper- 
fections. Although the Feldstein-Horioka analysis was subjected to a variety 
of criticisms, their basic finding appeared to hold up rather well. 
During the  1980s, foreign nationals demonstrated a phenomenal appetite 
for assets in the United States. Although the United States was a net supplier 9  Introduction 
of capital to the rest of the world in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, net inflows 
of foreign capital climbed seven-tenths of a percentage point (relative to GNP) 
in the early 1980s, and then shot up another two-and-a-half points in the late 
1980s. At year-end 1988, the Commerce Department estimated that foreign- 
ers had accumulated nearly $1.8 trillion worth of assets in the United States. 
This number exceeded the value of American-owned foreign assets by more 
than half a trillion dollars. 
These developments imply that the correlation between  domestic saving 
and investment noted by  Feldstein and Horioka may have declined signifi- 
cantly during the 1980s. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may have oc- 
curred because international capital markets became increasingly well inte- 
grated: governments reduced artificial barriers to capital flows, extensive new 
markets for hedging exchange-rate risks were developed, and financial insti- 
tutions became increasingly sophisticated. One might therefore expect na- 
tional policy regarding saving and capital income taxation to have very differ- 
ent effects in the 1990s than in the 1960s or 1970s. Two of the papers in this 
volume are concerned with evaluating the Feldstein-Horioka result and its in- 
terpretations in light of recent experience. 
In “National Saving and International Investment ,” Martin Feldstein and 
Philippe Bacchetta examine correlations between domestic saving and invest- 
ment for the period 1980-86, and compare these results with correlations for 
earlier periods.  They find  a  substantial decline in  the correlation between 
gross saving and gross investment and a somewhat smaller decline in the cor- 
relation between net saving and net investment. In addition, they document 
significant differences between  EEC  and  non-EEC countries.  Specifically, 
correlations between saving and investment for EEC countries have histori- 
cally been lower than for non-EEC countries and declined more rapidly be- 
tween the  1970s and  1980s. This evidence is consistent with the view that 
capital markets among the EEC countries have become highly integrated over 
the last decade. Even so, the impact of domestic saving on domestic invest- 
ment remains substantial. The evidence indicates that, during the 1980s, a one 
dollar increase in domestic saving added more than 50 cents to domestic in- 
vestment. 
Feldstein and Bacchetta argue that high correlations between saving and 
investment are likely to persist even with full integration of international cap- 
ital markets. With perfect integration, each investor would have to receive the 
same return, contracted in his domestic currency, on all equally risky invest- 
ments, domestic or foreign. This need not imply equality of real ex ante inter- 
est rates, where returns on investments in each country are denominated in its 
own currency, unless expected changes in exchange rates equal the difference 
between expected inflation rates.  Empirical violations of  purchasing power 
parity imply that this condition is often not met. Moreover, even though pur- 
chasing power parity  might hold in  the long run,  investors may  be  highly 
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international capital flows may respond very little to apparent interest-rate dif- 
ferentials. 
Several economists have proposed alternative explanations for the high cor- 
relation between saving and investment. It is extremely important to test the 
validity of these competing explanations, since each has different implications 
for public policy. One hypothesis, originally advanced by  Maurice Obstfeld, 
is that the Feldstein-Horioka results are spurious and reflect the common influ- 
ence of economic growth on both saving and investment. Feldstein and Bac- 
chetta’s analysis corroborates Obstfeld’s claim that this is a theoretical possi- 
bility, but their empirical analysis demonstrates that the relationship between 
investment and saving remains equally strong even when one includes mea- 
sures of  growth. An  alternative hypothesis, popularized by  Lawrence Sum- 
mers, is that governments actively seek external balance by manipulating fis- 
cal policy. Feldstein and Bacchetta point out that Summers’s evidence on the 
endogeneity of government deficits is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
deficits are exogenous, and that they crowd out private investment. 
Since the Feldstein-Horioka results concern long-run correlations between 
saving and investment, it is still possible that international capital flows ab- 
sorb a substantial fraction of  short-run fluctuations in domestic saving rates. 
Feldstein and Bacchetta investigate this possibility by estimating dynamic ad- 
justment processes for both saving and investment. They find that a gap be- 
tween domestic saving and investment raises investment in subsequent years 
but leaves saving unaffected. In particular, a saving-investment gap equal to 1 
percent of GDP causes the ratio of investment to GNP to rise by roughly one- 
quarter of a percentage point in the following year. 
In “Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the  1980s:’  Jeffrey A. 
Frankel discusses  four  distinct  definitions of  perfect capital mobility:  the 
Feldstein-Horioka definition, real  interest parity,  uncovered  interest  parity, 
and closed interest parity. He argues that full integration of financial markets 
would produce closed interest parity, but would not necessarily yield any of 
the other three conditions. 
Closed interest parity holds when interest rates are equalized across coun- 
tries for financial contracts that are written in a common currency. This con- 
dition would be violated only if there were significant barriers to the flow of 
financial  capital  across countries,  such  as  transactions costs,  information 
costs, capital controls (actual or potential), tax laws that discriminate by coun- 
try of residence, or default risk. Frankel tests this condition by using data on 
forward exchange rates for 25 countries to construct covered interest rate dif- 
ferentials. His calculations reveal that financial markets became increasingly 
integrated during the 1970s. Barriers to flows of financial capital remained for 
a few developed countries until the late 1970s and even mid-1980s. However, 
by  1988, integration of  financial markets had virtually eliminated all covered 
interest rate differentials for the major industrialized countries. 
Uncovered  interest  parity  holds when  an  investor who has  not  hedged 11  Introduction 
against exchange-rate risk expects to receive the same rate of return, denomi- 
nated in his own currency, on the bonds of all countries. This requires both 
closed interest parity,  as well as risk neutrality with respect to variations in 
exchange rates. Since investors are probably quite sensitive to exchange-rate 
risk, it would be rather surprising if this condition was  satisfied in practice. 
More generally, uncovered interest rate differentials measure exchange-rate 
risk premiums. Frankel’s decomposition of interest rate differentials provide a 
measure of these risk premiums. He finds that they have been both substantial 
and variable. 
Real interest parity holds when real interest rates are equalized across coun- 
tries. Frankel points out that this requires uncovered interest parity, plus the 
assumption that there can be no expected real depreciation of a country’s cur- 
rency. This assumption is satisfied only when goods markets are completely 
integrated.  In  practice,  transportation costs for some goods are high,  and 
many countries impose quotas and tariffs. Thus, the well-documented failure 
of real interest parity need not have anything to do with the efficiency of finan- 
cial markets. Frankel provides new evidence on expected changes in real ex- 
change rates and concludes that these expected changes explain a significant 
fraction of observed real interest rate differentials. 
Finally, the Feldstein-Horioka notion of capital mobility requires real inter- 
est rate parity, plus the assumption that national saving is uncorrelated with 
other determinants of  national investment. Frankel notes that the validity of 
this assumption has been disputed but argues that the Feldstein-Horioka re- 
sults are nevertheless quite robust.  He  also updates previous estimates. of 
the saving-investment correlation using data from the 1980s. In contrast to 
Feldstein and Bacchetta, he  employs time-series data for the United States 
rather than a cross section of different countries. His results suggest that the 
Feldstein-Horioka result has broken down to a much greater extent than is 
indicated by the work of Feldstein and Bacchetta. 
Taxes, Saving, and Growth 
The final three papers in this volume deal with national saving and eco- 
nomic growth. In a closed economy, it is saving that funds and permits invest- 
ment. While there is some debate about the exact magnitude of the contribu- 
tion,  it is  universally agreed that  one of  the key  contributors to economic 
growth is a rapidly growing capital stock. In such a closed economy, the ques- 
tion of the adequacy of saving is the same issue as the adequacy of investment. 
In an open economy situation, there is no reason why investment and saving 
in a particular country should be equated. Savers simply would look all over 
the world for the highest return on their investments, taking account of  the 
various risk factors. 
In “A Cross-country Study of  Growth, Saving, and Government,” Robert 
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growth rates and saving rates for economies. He  first presents a model in 
which public goods and services, jointly with private capital, determine per 
capita output. The model features an infinitely lived representative agent who 
maximizes intertemporal utility. Public goods and  services are financed by 
proportional income taxes and the government runs a balanced budget. With 
some assumptions regarding technology, Barro finds that the growth rate of 
per capita output initially increases with increases in the level of government 
investment, but  that  at higher levels of  government investment and  taxes, 
growth is eventually retarded. Government consumption, in contrast to gov- 
ernment investment, does not enter into production functions and definitely 
depresses economic growth and saving rates in his model. 
Barro extends his initial model to include endogenous population growth 
and adds a distinction between physical and human capital. Human capital 
consists of two components, raw unskilled labor and accumulated human cap- 
ital. Population growth is in effect a form of saving and investment, as is skill 
acquisition or extra human capital. Higher rates of population growth require 
adults to spend more time raising children, which in the model lowers the 
return to human capital investments. 
Barro’s empirical work in the paper involves the cross-country estimation 
of four interdependent endogenous variables. The dependent variables that he 
is trying to explain are per capita GDP growth, the ratio of  physical invest- 
ment to GDP, human capital acquisition (measured through the rate of second- 
ary school enrollment), and population growth. The independent explanatory 
variables include five classes of government expenditures (measured as a ratio 
to GDP), a proxy for the treatment of property rights, dummies for socialist 
and mixed economies, and one for violent war or revolution. 
Barro’s results are often consistent with  his theoretical models. For ex- 
ample, public consumption spending is systematically inversely related  to 
growth and investment. On the other hand, public investment tends to be pos- 
itively correlated with growth and investment. The results regarding property 
rights tend to indicate that they stimulate growth and both physical and human 
capital investment. Finally, there appears to be a strong negative interaction 
between population growth and investment in human capital. Barro refers to 
this as the trade-off between the quantity and the quality of children. He char- 
acterizes his paper as a progress report on a large research project to gain a 
better understanding of the determinants of economic growth. 
In “Consumption Growth Parallels Income Growth: Some New Evidence,” 
Christopher D.  Carroll  and  Lawrence H.  Summers also  deal  with  cross- 
country issues of  growth and saving, although without Barro’s concentration 
on government expenditures. Carroll and Summers challenge the empirical 
validity of  representative agent life-cycle theories,  or the modeling  of  the 
economy as infinite horizon optimizers as in the theoretical sections of Barro’s 
paper. They find that the aggregate consumption and saving implications of 13  Introduction 
these fashionable representations of aggregate behavior are grossly inconsist- 
ent with the features of cross-country and cross-section data on consumption 
and saving. The authors begin with the inference of the infinite horizon rep- 
resentative agent model that consumption growth should depend on the differ- 
ence between the real interest rate and the rate of time preference. The growth 
rate of consumption should also be related to the elasticity of substitution of 
consumption, but the theory says that it should be independent of the rate of 
growth of  income. When Carroll and Summers examine the cross-country 
data, they find that they do not conform to the predictions of  the model. In 
particular, they observe a very high correlation between the rate of growth of 
consumption and the rate of growth of income. Further, the predicted positive 
correlation of  consumption growth with real interest rates is not readily ap- 
parent. 
Carroll and Summers examine several possible ways to reconcile long ho- 
rizon optimization models with the international empirical evidence. One by 
one, the attempted reconciliations are rejected.  The authors find that  con- 
sumption tracks income more closely than these theories would predict, both 
at the aggregate level and at the individual level. The pattern of the consump- 
tion of the elderly relative to that of  the young across countries also is incon- 
sistent with what the long horizon optimization models would predict. Ulti- 
mately, the authors reject all models with lifetime or longer horizons. 
Carroll and Summers conclude with two suggestions. First, they think that 
the evidence favors Milton Friedman’s original view that permanent income 
should not be regarded as lifetime income (or income over even a longer ho- 
rizon), but simply as the mean or expected income over a much shorter hori- 
zon, perhaps several years. They think that a model in which most households 
are liquidity constrained or only hold a “buffer stock” of  saving may be de- 
scriptive of the real world. Second, the authors suggest that the bulk of saving 
in most economies is done by a very small minority of the population and that 
these households may behave differently than others. That is, they suggest 
that the consumption and saving behavior of “savers” is possibly quite differ- 
ent than the consumption and saving choices of the vast majority of  the popu- 
lation. They offer this insight as a guide for additional research on this topic. 
In  “Saving Behavior in Ten  Developing Countries,” Susan Collins docu- 
ments cross-country differences in rates of  saving, as well as within-country 
trends over time for a sample of developing countries. She also attempts to 
explain the observed differences of saving behavior. In particular, she explores 
the roles of economic growth, standard of living, and the age distribution of 
the population. 
Collins’s calculations reveal that  the experiences of  developing countries 
have been quite diverse. For the period 1960-84,  gross saving (expressed as 
a fraction of GNP) ranged from a low of  11.9 percent in Indonesia, to a high 
of  24.3 percent  in  Singapore.  Countries with  higher rates  of  saving  also 14  B. Douglas Bernheim and John B. Shoven 
tended to grow more rapidly. Her analysis of the data suggests that there is 
very little relationship between saving and income inequality, and that stan- 
dard of living only affects the rate of saving in relatively poor countries. 
One striking feature of the data is that four of the 10 countries experienced 
massive  increases in rates  of  saving  during the  1960s, 1970s, and  1980s. 
Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong all eventually achieved gross sav- 
ing rates in excess of  one-third  of  GDP,  despite the fact that all saved very 
little in the early 1960s (e.g., Hong Kong saved only 2% of  GNP in 1960). 
This evidence calls into question the importance of “cultural” determinants of 
saving, since it indicates that many Asian countries achieved high rates of 
saving through rather dramatic behavioral changes. 
Collins develops a formal model of life-cycle saving and uses it to motivate 
an econometric analysis of the data. She emphasizes that, according to theory, 
one needs to control for interactions between the various determinants of sav- 
ing (such as growth, income, and age distribution). Her estimated equations 
bear this prediction  out. Moreover, they account for a substantial portion of 
the differences in saving behavior both across countries and over time. On the 
basis of these estimates, Collins concludes that there appear to be fundamen- 
tal,  structural differences  between  the  determinants of  saving  in  low-  and 
middle-income countries. 
Finally, Collins conducts a detailed analysis of  rates of saving in Korea. 
She argues that the trend toward collective frugality has, to a large extent, 
been driven by the household sector. This conclusion is supported by house- 
hold survey data that decomposes saving into rural and urban components. 
Collins interprets the Korean experience in light of her econometric estimates. 
This allows her to speculate about the special determinants of rising saving in 
Korea. 